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In the case of Douglas v. Murphy3 a new wrinkle was pre-
sented in an old case. 4 After the previous extensive litigation,
the plaintiff had finally acquired from the State of Louisiana the
patent for certain land claimed by virtue of old warrants. Appli-
cation was made in 1919 to have the lands located under the
warrants, but the patent was not issued to the property until
1941. In the present suit, the defendant contended that acquisitive
prescription by adverse possession started to run against the land-
owner from the date of application to locate the warrant. How-
ever, the court held that there was no passing of title until the
patent was issued and, consequently, acquisitive prescription
could not commence until that time. It would have been a little
incongruous to penalize a person for failure to exercise the right
of ownership before he had acquired it.
PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
LOCATION OF "SHORE" AND "RIPARIAN RIGHTS"
In the case of Doiron v. O'Bryan' the sale of a property
described a part of the boundary as "following the meanderings
of the lake shore ... together with all riparian rights belonging
to the vendor." The dispute centered on the location of the
meander line of the lake shore (Calcasieu Lake) and the scope
to be attributed to the phrase "riparian rights."
By reason of both natural phenomena and artificial opera-
tions, the property involved had been subjected to a variety of
shorelines since 1812. Both of the present litigants had been
defendants in State v. Erwin,2 and the present property was
covered by the holding of that case in which the original 1812
shoreline was sustained as against the State of Louisiana. There
was neither gain nor loss by reason of erosion. The overruling
of this principle in Miami Corporation v. State3 did not change
3. 218 La. 888, 51 So. 2d 310 (1951).
4. State ex rel. Hyam's Heirs v. Grace, 173 La. 215, 136 So. 569 (1931);
and 197 La. 428, 1 So. 2d 683 (1941).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 218 La. 1069, 51 So. 2d 628 (1951).
2. 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931).
3. 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1937).
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the res judicata effect of the Erwin decision concerning the prop-
erty involved.
The approach of the court in the case at bar is on the basis
of the interpretation of the basic agreement between the parties,
but since the words "shore" and "riparian rights" have not
received very extensive interpretation in this kind of context,
the holding is particularly significant. From the wording of the.
deed, the court concluded that the parties intended to describe
the lands above water and, accordingly, held that the word
"shore" referred to the edge of the high land as it existed at the
time of the transaction.
To ascertain the intent of the parties in the conveyance of
"all riparian rights," the court admitted extraneous evidence
and concluded that the term embraced all rights of the riparian
landowner not only in the use of the waterway itself but also
potential rights in the submerged land forming part of the bed
of the water course. Accordingly, the plaintiff was held to have
transferred "all his right, title and interest in and to the sub-
merged lands" involved in the controversy. The defendant's
ownership therefore extended to the shoreline of Calcasieu Lake
as it existed in 1812.
SERVITUDES
An unusual problem concerning the servitude of drainage
was presented in the case of Elam v. Cortinas.4 The dry bed of an
old bayou had been filled in by the adjoining proprietors, and
this resulted in reversing the natural drainage direction of these
properties. The plaintiff was among the proprietors who had
participated in this operation, and in the present case he sought
an injunction to prevent interference by the defendant with this
new drainage direction. The court held that the impediment
imposed by the defendant on this new drainage direction did not
constitute a violation of Article 660 of the Civil Code. In view
of the language of the article which provides that the lower estate
must "receive the waters which run naturally from the estate
situated above, provided the industry of man has not been used
to create that servitude," the court concluded that the natural
drainage no longer existed and that the article had no application
to this case.5
4. 219 La. 406, 53 So. 2d 146 (1951).
5. The original French text in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 and in the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 contains a phrase which would be more accu-
1952]
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This case may bring to mind, but must be distinguished
from, the Ruston swimming pool case 6 where the pool was emp-
tied across the plaintiff's land, but even though a violation was
found the court awarded damages instead of an injunction.
RIGHT-OF-WAY; SERVITUDE OR OWNERSHIP
Questions concerning the juridical nature of a right-of-way
have long been troublesome in Louisiana.7 Sometimes the right
acquired is a servitude, but sometimes the complete ownership
of the land is transferred. These possibilities are present both in
the establishment of private rights-of-way as well as public
rights-of-way. When parties conclude a voluntary agreement,
the right-of-way may be either a servitude or a conveyance of
perfect ownership, depending upon their intent. When the
right-of-way is established by a public body in virtue of statutory
authorization, the nature of the right-of-way is determined in
accordance with the provisions and interpretation of the statute
under which the particular action is taken. One of the statutory
provisions for the establishment of a public right-of-way was
Section 3369 of the Revised Statutes of 1870 (now Title 48, Sec-
tion 492 of the Revised Statutes of 1950).
The dispute in Ham v. Strenzke Realty Company, Incorpo-
rated," started when the East Baton Rouge Parish Police Jury
commenced proceedings under Section 3369 to obtain a right-of-
way over certain lands in order to complete a road to Louisiana
State University along what is now Nicholson Drive. However,
instead of the proceedings being pursued to a conclusion, the
landowner made a voluntary conveyance to the police jury by a
deed which the police jury claims to be a transfer of perfect
ownership but which the landowner claims to have conveyed
only a servitude. If only a servitude was conveyed, the right-
of-way would have been lost by ten years non-use.9 However,
if the conveyance was one of ownership, the police jury would
not have lost any rights by non-use. On the basis of the clear
language of the deed, the court held that it was a conveyance of
rately translated into English as follows: "provided the industry of man has
not contributed to the flow." This correct translation gives a more accurate
reflection of the situation covered by the code article, and is certainly a
clearer basis for excluding the present situation from the scope of the article's,
application.
6. Adams v. Town of Ruston, 194 La. 403, 193 So. 688 (1940).
7. Comment, 8 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 553 (1948).
8. 218 La. 499, 50 So. 2d 11 (1951).
9. Art. 789, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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ownership, and the price paid was found to represent the full
market value at the time. Although the words of a deed may be
superseded by information on a map in accordance with the intent
of the parties, the present facts disclosed no such data. Further-
more, there was affixed to the document the United States reve-
nue stamp for a deed of sale whereas no such stamp would have
been necessary for a deed conveying only a servitude. The fact
that under Section 3369 the police jury would have acquired
only a servitude became irrelevant when the proceedings under
that statute were dropped by reason of the voluntary conveyance.
SALES
J. Denson Smith*
The court was called upon to consider the effectiveness of an
out-of-state conditional sales contract in Cobb v. Davidson.1 The
decision of the court of appeal that held the transaction ineffec-
tive in Louisiana on the ground that the evidence did not estab-
lish lack of knowledge on the part of the vendor and assignee of
removal from the State of Texas, where the transaction occurred,
was reversed. The supreme court took the view that the burden
of proving knowledge of removal was on the defendant as a
special affirmative defense. The decisions of the supreme court
have heretofore recognized the effectiveness of foreign conditional
sales except when to the knowledge of the seller at the time of
the transaction the property is being bought for removal to Loui-
siana. In the instant case the court seems to have accepted the
view expressed earlier in lower court opinions that the vendor's
protection is destroyed also if he has knowledge of the subsequent
removal of the thing sold. Perhaps the present case will not be
considered conclusive on the point.
Another conditional sales contract came before the court in
Lee Construction Company v. L. M. Ray Construction Corpora-
tion.2 The court relied on the Barber case3 to the effect that the
distinction between a lease with an option to purchase and a sale
is that in the latter the vendee promises to pay a price while in
the former he merely has an option to pay. It found a so-called
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 219 La. 434, 53 So. 2d 225 (1951).
2. 219 La. 246, 52 So. 2d 841 (1951).
3. Barber Asphalt & Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 46
So. 193 (1908).
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